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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INSURANCE AND .ANNUITY COMBINA-

TIONS-Decedent, aged seventy-six, invested in three single premium life
insurance policies. Issuance of each was conditioned on the purchase of
a single life, nonrefundable annuity of specified value, and no physical
examination was required. Each combination was balanced so that the
total premium, exclusive of loading charges, equalled the face value of
the insurance. The resulting correlation between compound interest and
annuity disbursements made the guaranteed payments to the annuitant
correspond precisely with the expected income of a reinvestment of the
entire deposit by the insurer.1 Decedent retained the annuity rights, but
all present an_d future interests in the life policies were transferred to her
children and the plaintiff-executor eight years prior to her death.2 The
Commissioner contended that the insurance proceeds were subject to an
estate tax under I.R.C., section 2036, which includes in the gross estate
the value of any property of which decedent has at any time made a transfer
for less than a full and adequate consideration "under which he has retained for life . . • (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the property. . . ." 3 This contention was rejected by the district court4 but accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.5
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three
justices dissenting. Although each combination was the product of a
single, integrated transaction, ·the contracts were from the time of issuance separate and distinct and decedent could not, therefore, be said to
have retained a life interest in the transferred property. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
Essentially,_ the basic question in the case was what constituted the
"property" which decedent transferred to the donees. Because of the
actuarial relationship, the government took the position that each policy
of life insurance with its corresponding annuity made one indivisible investment. The company's agreement would thus be viewed as being
to return the principal sum at death with interest payable to decedent
in the meantime, the gift to the insurance beneficiary consisting of a
remainder interest only. Such an approach has been accepted by a

:! For a detailed explanation of the actuarial concepts involved, see Commissioner
v. Keller's .Estate, (3d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 833.
2 Decedent's children were named primary beneficiaries and the plaintiff-executor
contingent beneficiary to take under trust the share of any child that might pre-decease
the insured. Two of the policies appear to confer the right of cash surrender on the
children directly and not in their capacities as beneficiaries. That right in the third
policy was eventually transferred to the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement making the
aforesaid trust thereafter unalterable and irrevocable.
3 I.R.C. (1939), §811(c)(l)(B), as amended 63 Stat. 894, §7(a) (1949), involved in the
principal case, was reinacted -unchanged as I.R.C. (1954), §2036.
4 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, (E.D. Pa. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 561.
5 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, (3d Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 690.
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majority of courts passing on this type of arrangement. 6 Moreover, the
Supreme Court previously has decided that the life insurance proceeds
in this context are not to be considered "insurance" for estate tax purposes,7 a result which now appears settled8 and which is explainable only
if the •two contracts are considered an entity. But in the principal case
the Court concluded that each policy is a separate item of property, stressing that the annuity could have been acquired alone, that it would have
continued unimpaired had the life policy been extinguished, and that
either could have been separately assigned.9 The result appears to have
been reached primarily because the contracts, after issuance, had a formally independent existence. The Court has often stated, however, that
it will look to substance rather than form or legal niceties in matters of
taxation.10 In view of this and of the fact that both the petitioner's and
government's arguments are logically sound, it would seem more satisfactory to approach the basic question by also considering whether -the
economic realities and statutory purpose decree that the contracts should
be thought of as indivisible. In an analogous series of cases the decedent
made in substance a complete and irrevocable -transfer of property in return
for a contractual promise of certain payments for the remainder of his
life. The transferred property generally has been held to be free of any
estate tax liability on grounds that the donor could not be said to have
retained any possessory interest or enjoyment therein.11 Similarly, trans6 Burr v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 871; Conway v. Glenn, (6th Cir.
1952) 193 F. (2d) 965; Estate of Reynolds, 45 B.T.A. 44 (1941). Contra, Bohnen v. Harrison,
(7th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 492, affd. per curiam 345 U.S. 946 (1953), by an equally divided
Court. The tax court has held that an actual surrender by the donee prior to the transferor's death would avoid the tax. Estate of Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953). Reasoning
from substance, however, it is difficult to see why this event, which has no effect either
on decedent or her estate, should reverse the outcome.
7 Commissioner v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). The Court there said, at 539 to 541,
that to constitute insurance, "the amounts must be received as the result of a transaction
which involved an actual 'insurance risk' at the time the transaction was executed. . . •
We cannot find such an insurance risk in the contracts. . . • The . • . annuity and
the insurance are opposites; in this combination the one neutralizes the risk customarily
inherent in the other." In LeGierse there had been no assignment of the insurance
rights, but this factor does not appear to be significant. "The principle that the proceeds
are not considered 'receivable . . . as insurance' applies whether at death the rights
and benefits of the policies are in the hands of the insured or another person." Principal case at 278, note 3. It is clear that as the purpose and result of the interrelationship
of the contracts is to avoid incurring any insurance risk, the combined premium in this
sense is looked upon by the company as an aggregate sum.
s It nevertheless seems arguable that for income tax purposes the proceeds should
be considered "insurance" in the hands of the ·beneficiary. The Court has yet to pass
directly on this question.
9 Principal case at 280.
10 E.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
11 E.g., Welch v. Hall, (1st Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 366; Hirsh v. United States, (Ct.
CI. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 982. These and similar decisions are often referred to as "private
annuity" cases. See generally, Surrey and Aronson, "Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REv. 1332 (1932).
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£erred property ·has not been taxed merely because the donor later made
use of, or received benefits from it at the sufferance of the donee. The
rationale has been that the statutory language requires such results.12
_Standing alone, however, such an argument is not persuasive since in the
area of taxation the courts have never been adverse to treating one situation "as if' it were another when they are convinced this is warranted.13
Nevertheless, where the_ contract liability neither restricts nor is dependent upon the donee's use or enjoyment of the gift res, the result
that has been reached appears desirable because the interest of the donor
does not remain, after the transaction, directly related to that which he has
given away; rather, his interest and that of the transferee are independent
of one another. On the other hand, in cases involving joint and survivor
annuities, where the basic question is identical with that in the principal
case, the contract has been held taxable as akin to a trust in which an
annual sum is reserved by, the settlor to be paid from income and corpus
with remainder over. 14 The Court in .the instant case distinguishes these
cases on the grounds that if the donor's annuity is extinguished the donee's
interest is destroyed, and that beneficial enjoyment by the donee is dependent upon and must aV{ait the death of the donor.15 The first argument is not
persuasive.16 But in terms of economic realities the Court would seem
justified in drawing a distinction between cases in which the donee could
presently obtain possessory enjoyment and those in which he could not.
The former situation, in which the donor's death is of formal significance only and where all essential incidents of ownership are vested in
the donee, conceivably should result· in no estate taxation. The opinions,
however, have not stressed this factor as determinative either in the
insurance-annuity cases or in cases involving analogous problems. Indeed,

12 See Gardner v. Delaney, (D.C. Mass. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 610 at 616. Compare
generally, Peek v. United States, (E.D. Pa. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 826.
13 It has· been suggested that this approach be taken if the "annuity" closely approximates the expected income from the property transferred. Surrey and Aronson,
"Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REV. 1332 (1932). However
in a case where decedent gave to his wife a gift equal in amount to the purchase price
of an insurance contract on his life, and himself bought an annuity so she could obtain
such ·a contract, the death proceeds were held to be not includible in his estate. Estate
of Dundore, P-H 1942 T.C. -Mem. Dec. lf42,028.
14 E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, (9th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 998; Forster v. Sauber,
(7th Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 379. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1939)
102 F. (2d) 380. Where purchase of the annuity has been by decedent's employer, however,
the result has been otherwise. Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate; (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F.
(2d) 627; Higgs' Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 427. These latter cases
appear to be in basic conflict with the former group, treating the original contract
as in reality two separate annuities, a present one for the first annuitant and a deferred
one for the survivor. Joint and survivor annuities are now specifically treated in I.R.C.,
§2039.
15 Principal case at 279, note 5.
16 The contract involved is often irrevocable and thus the question of extinguishment
is not material. E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, note 14 supra.
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the Supreme Court expressly rejected it in interpreting section 811 (c)
(I) (C) of the 1939 code,11 and it remains to be seen whether it will be incorporated as a limitation on the principal decision. Further, desirable ·as
this distinction may be, it is a difficult one to arrive at through any analysis
of section 2036 itself since it necessarily involves as a point of reference the
point of the transferee. In the comparatively early case of May v. Heiner,18
the Court held an irrevocable trust with life interest retained not to be subject to an estate tax under the "take effect at death" clause. What is now
section 2036 was Congress' answer to this decision and appears to have been
specifically aimed at including in the taxable estate transfers where actual
possession is postponed until death though title vests indefeasibly in the
donee at an earlier date.19 In view of this objective it should be arguable
that if decedent in the instant case gave the rights of cash surrender to the
donees other than as beneficiaries,20 the situation is outside the intended
reach of the relevant taxing provision since the donor's death is no
longer of pivotal significance. The manner in which the section is written,
however, requires analysis from the viewpoint c E the donor.21 This
being so, the persuasiveness of the principal decision rests on finding a
meaningful difference between the instant case and that of an irrevocable
trust with life interest retained. The latter appears clearly within the
purview of section 2036 even though the remainder beneficiaries may,
absent express disabling restraints, alienate their interests prior to the
transferor's death.22 Such a difference may lie in the fact that to decedent
the contracts were distinct since they served separate purposes and, as

17 Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945). The case involved an insuranceannuity combination where the donor-"insured" retained a contingent reversionary in.
terest in the entire proceeds of both contracts but gave the donee-beneficiary the power
to cut off this interest at any time. However, as the donee did not do this the Court
held that as a matter of objective fact the transfer was not finally effectuated until the
donor's death.
1s 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
19 See 74 CoNG. REc. 77199 (1931); H. Rep. 1412, 81st Cong, 1st sess. (1949).
20 If the donees held this right as beneficiaries its effective exercise would have been
contingent on the children surviving the decedent. See principal case, appellate court
opinion at 692, note 5 supra. In this situation, which has not been present in similar
cases, the better view would clearly appear to be that of upholding the tax since the
effective enjoyment would necessarily have been postponed until the donor's death.
21 That is, the ultimate question in each case is not what the donee can or cannot
do but what, if anything, the donor has retained. After promulgation of the predecessor
of §2036, the Court reversed May v. Heiner, note 18 supra, in Commissioner v. Estate
of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). This decision, with others such as Goldstone v. United
States, note 17 supra, and Helvering v. Hallock, note 10 supra, shows the Court, undoubtedly influenced ·by the passage of what is now §2036, coming to interpret the
"take effect at death" clause also from the viewpoint of the donor.
22 There is in fact a greater likelihood that an indefeasible remainder interest in a
trust would be prematurely conveyed than that an insurance policy of comparable face
value would be surrendered since the discounted value of the former interest almost
always exceeds the cash surrender value of the latter.
-
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noted _in the opinion, were independently assigI_1able with the possibility
that the insurance could hav~ been surrendered_ without affecting tp.e
annuity. As opposed to the trust situation, the donor from her viewpoint did not retain any interest in that which sh~ transferred. And the
fact that the relationship upon which the government's position rests
was created not at her instance but at that of the company, and for a
purpose not directly relevant to the issue under consideration, would
indicate that the Court was correct in accepting the viewpoint of the
donor in this case.28 The decision, then, conforms with those in the
"private annuity" cases and on the whole appears desirable, at least
when viewed in the comparatively narrow context of the fact situation
actually involved. But when considered in relation to the overall backdrop
of section 2036, it becomes apparent that the Court has given to insurance
companies a device which, if effectively exploited, can virtually emasculate
that section of the code.
John B. Schwemm, S.Ed.

23 As previously indicated, §2036 views the ultimate question of taxability in terms
of the donor rather than the donee. But the principal case involved the additional,
initial question of what "property" was transferred. The determination of this question
depends largely on whether the original transaction is viewed from the standpoint of
the donor or that of the insurance company, and it would appear unwarranted to rely
solely on the structure of §2036 for this answer.

